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Professional associations and other producer groups often complain that
their reputation is damaged by other groups providing a similar but lower-
quality service and that the latter should be regulated. We examine the condi-
tions under which a common regulatory regime can induce Pareto-improvements
by creating a common reputation for quality among heterogeneous producers,
when the regulator cannot commit to a given quality. A common reputation
can be created only if the groups are not too different and if marginal cost
is declining. High cost groups and small groups benefit most from forming a
common regime.
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Many professions are subject to occupational licensing and quality regulation,
with, in many cases, the standards set by the professional groups themselves. A
common, perhaps majority, view among economists is that such monopoly licensing
arrangements are devices to increase the incomes of the producers at the expense
of the consumers. An alternative view is that if there is asymmetric information
between producer and consumer then setting minimum standards can bring about a
Pareto-improvement by increasing the trust that the client has in the professional:
consumers are more willing to buy the service if there is less risk that the provider is
incompetent or fraudulent. Evidence that, historically, producer incomes rise when
licensing is introduced (see Law and Kim (2005)) is consistent with both hypotheses.
An alternative solution might be for producers to develop individual reputations for
high quality, but this may be inadequate in the cases of occupations, such as those of
physicians or realtors, whose service is purchased infrequently or for which there are
serious consequences if something goes wrong.
This still does not establish a case for state-enforced licensing or regulation. Why
should the professional groups not form voluntary associations which set standards
for their members to adhere to and thereby establish collective reputations1 for the
chosen quality? This private solution allows for the possibility that, alongside a given
professional group, other groups (‘para-professions’) might form parallel associations
which establish their own reputations for a different standard of the same, or a similar,
service. Why should such groups be denied entry?
One possible answer is that there is a reputational externality: the actions of one
group may damage the reputation of another group, thereby reducing overall welfare.
Partly on these grounds, in the UK, physicians have objected to allowing nurses
to perform procedures previously reserved for doctors and lawyers have objected to
1An Office of Fair Trading report on the UK estate agency (realtor) market remarked: ‘Effective
codes, those that have high recognition among consumers and are well enforced, should also help to
marginalise rogue traders within a sector. Whole sectors of business can suffer through the behaviour
of the rogue element which can damage consumer confidence.’ (OFT (2004), p.112).
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allowing licensed conveyancers to sell house conveyancing (escrow?) services.
The above phenomenon is not limited to groups of professionals. An historical
case study which is important in the development of state-sponsored auditing re-
quirements is that of credit cooperatives in nineteenth century Germany (Guinnane
(2003)). The German credit cooperatives were divided into a number of associations,
the most important of which were a primarily urban group begun in the 1850s under
the leadership of Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch and an overwhelmingly rural group be-
gun in the 1860s and associated with Friedrich-Wilhelm Raiffeisen. Like many later
cooperatives, they were all small banks funded by retained earnings, member capital
contributions, and deposits, but there were important differences between the groups
in size, member liability, staffing, lending practices, and relationships with other finan-
cial institutions. Schulze-Delitzsch and his followers argued that all German credit
cooperatives were viewed by the public as similar to each other and distinct from
other financial institutions such as commercial banks; moreover, bad news about one
of Raiffeisen’s cooperatives could harm those in Schulze-Delitszch’s group. From the
1860s and 1870s, some cooperative groups made regular audits a condition of group
membership and the Schulze-Delitszch group campaigned for a law requiring all co-
operatives to be subject to regular audits. A law was duly passed in 1889 requiring
an audit every two years (by one of the private auditing associations in most cases).2
This law was an important precursor of the later laws on mandatory audits of joint-
stock companies. However, even after the 1889 law, each group complained that it
was being damaged because the other’s standards were too low.3
In effect, each group of cooperatives complained that they would like to raise
their standards, but that it was too hard, given the low standards of the other group
2Schulze-Delitszch regarded it as important that it should be possible for the auditing to be
conducted by the associations themselves, rather than government, partly because of a fear of state
expropriation, but also because of a moral hazard argument, that state monitoring would be an
inferior substitute for, and drive out, self-monitoring. See Guinnane (2003).
3Similar developments took place in the US in the nineteenth century. Buildings and Loans As-
sociations (B&Ls), predecessors of the Savings and Loans, attempted with some success to persuade
states to pass laws excluding “nationals”, institutions offering similar savings and loan contracts,
but differently organized and operating on much larger geographical scales. The B&Ls argued that
problems in the nationals would hurt the reputation and business of the B&Ls. See Snowden (2003)
and Brumbaugh (1988).
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- perhaps because the reputational cost of cutting quality in one group does not
all fall on that group but, through the reputational externality effect, partly on the
other group. However, this begs a number of questions. Firstly, why should there be
any collective reputation or reputational externality? After all, as long as consumers
can observe the fact that you belong to association A, the actions of members of
association B should be irrelevant to your reputation. Secondly, if all producers (and
consumers) can benefit from the existence of a legally-mandated common quality
standard, would they not also benefit from forming a merged professional body4 which
imposes a common standard on all its members? In that case, those producers who
chose to remain outside would suffer because they did not belong to any certifying
body, so that this solution should be credible and state involvement unnecessary.
However, this in turn begs the question whether, or under what conditions, it
is possible for a group of heterogeneous producers to develop a common reputation
through regulation, whether private or state. Consider two groups which are homoge-
neous internally, but different from each other, perhaps in their cost of achieving high
quality. Suppose that they decide to join a single body for the purpose of standard-
setting and auditing, but that consumers can still tell which group a consumer belongs
to. Suppose further that (a) the auditor chooses standards to maximize the total prof-
its of all the producers, and (b) the auditor cannot commit in advance to the standard
which he will enforce. The latter assumption stems from the supposition that the au-
ditor has no more commitment power than the producers, and that a producer cannot
commit to a given quality before supplying a service (if he could there would be no
problem of asymmetric information). In that case, under what conditions is it cred-
ible that the auditor would set (as opposed to merely announcing to the public) the
same standard for both types of producer? Might it not be optimal for him, even if
the public believes that there is a common standard, to set a lower standard where
high quality is more expensive to achieve? The same considerations may apply in the
case of state regulation, particularly where, as frequently happens, the regulation is
carried out by industry insiders, or where, as in our model, social surplus coincides
4Indeed, in the 1920s the German cooperative associations did merge into a single body.
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with producer profit because producers are price-discriminating local monopolists.
Where reputational externality does not exist, and the conditions do not exist for
common regulation to lead to a Pareto-improving common quality, the supposition
must be that the purpose of monopoly licensing is to restrict competition.
We examine these questions in the context of a dynamic model, set out in Section
2, with the following features. In each period large numbers of new consumers arrive,
each of whom will live for two periods, has unit demand in each period, and observes
the quality only of her own purchases (and only ex post). There are large numbers
of long-lived small producers each of whom is a local monopolist and is matched
randomly with consumers; there is no entry of producers. Thus it is not possible to
develop an individual reputation for quality and the anti-competitive motivation for
quality regulation is absent. Each producer belongs to one of two groups, which are
distinguished by their cost of achieving high quality, cq; the latter cost has to be paid
in a given period for quality to be high in that period. As mentioned above, consumers
can tell, before buying, which group a producer belongs to, even if there is a single
auditor for both groups. They do not observe the values of cq. The auditor(s) can
choose and enforce quality but cannot commit (as far as the consumer is concerned)
to a given quality in advance.
We find, in Section 3, that if the two groups are heterogeneous, in the sense that
their costs of high quality (cq) are independent random variables, then no reputational
externality exists when the two groups are separately audited and regulated - in any
equilibrium, a change in the quality of one group has no effect on a consumer’s belief
about the other group. On the other hand, every equilibrium is inefficient because
of the existence of two groups: if there were a single homogeneous group with a
single auditor then full efficiency could be achieved. A reputational externality does
exist if the groups are homogeneous (the cost of high quality is the same for both
groups). Moreover, this gives rise to a worse equilibrium than in the independent
costs case if, in addition, marginal production costs are declining over the relevant
range. On the other hand, there is always an equilibrium in which, because of the
reputational externality, quality and profits are higher than in the heterogeneous case;
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furthermore, the bad reputational equilibrium does not exist if marginal production
cost is constant. We conclude from this that reputational externality is not a strong
argument for common regulation. Even in those cases where it may lead to more
inefficiency, the problem could in principle be solved by co-ordinating on a better
equilibrium.
In answer to the question whether it is possible for heterogeneous groups to de-
velop, through common regulation, a common reputation for quality, we find, in
Section 4, that it is possible (and, thus, a common auditing framework can bring
about a Pareto-improvement) only if (a) the two groups are not too dissimilar, in the
sense that the support of cq is not too large, and (b) if marginal production costs are
declining. Given these conditions, a collective reputation can be created. The reason
that marginal production costs must be declining is that, for consumers to believe
that, despite heterogeneous cost of quality, the quality is the same in both groups,
quality in group A must, given this belief, be a strategic complement for quality in
group B. If marginal cost is declining then the fact that quality is high this period
in group A, and so, given the consumers’ beliefs, demand at group B will be high
next period, means that the marginal benefit of setting quality high at B this period
(through repeat custom for B-producers) is greater than it would be if quality were
low at A. Thus, in equilibrium, high quality at one group is associated with high
quality at the other, and similarly in the case of low quality.
One case in which declining marginal cost may obtain, and so common regulation
is more likely to be appropriate, is the case in which learning-by-doing is important.
Suppose that, because of technological progress, producers need to upgrade their
skills in every period and that this takes place partly through learning-by-doing.
Then, within a given period, marginal cost of producing the first units will be higher
than marginal cost of producing subsequent units, at least up to a point.
We also ask, in Section 5, which groups benefit most from common regulation, in
the case where common regulation can credibly lead to common standards. Does a
high quality (in the sense of lower average value of cq) group benefit more than a low
quality group? Does a small group benefit more than a large group? We find that
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in the uniform case a low-quality group benefits more than a high-quality group. We
also find that a small group has a lower expected profit under common regulation
than a large group (because, having less weight in determining the standard, the
small group is more likely to have a standard which is excessively onerous for it) but
that a small group benefits more from introducing common regulation, because it is
even worse off without it.
The above results are relevant in any context in which the actions of one group
of agents may possibly affect the reputation of another group. For example, chains
of hotels, restaurants, etc., attempt to establish reputations for a common standard
of service across the whole chain. Under what conditions is it credible that such a
reputation can be established for outlets in, say, different geographical regions with
different costs? To take other examples, securities exchanges monitor their members
to prevent fraud, universities create organizations that certify their standards, and so
on.
Related Literature
There is a small theoretical literature on professional regulation. Leland (1979)
analyzed professional licensing as a policy response to a lemons problem. Shaked and
Sutton (1981), in a similar model, analyzed the incentives to form para-professions.
Shapiro (1986) studied a moral hazard model in which licensing is viewed as a re-
quirement for prior investment which alters the incentives to produce high quality.
This differs from our model in a number of ways; for example, sellers in the Shapiro
model are able to build individual reputations. Lizzeri (1999) analyzed the incentives
of private intermediaries who certify quality; the focus of his paper is on strategic
manipulation of information. None of these papers is concerned with collective rep-
utation. There are three types of theory of collective reputation in the literature.
Firstly, there is a multiple equilibrium theory (e.g., Arrow (1973)). Secondly, some
papers (e.g., Benabou and Gertner (1993)) derive collective reputation from the exis-
tence of a common trait. Both of these phenomena are present in our analysis below
of the case in which the groups have a common value of cq. Thirdly, Tirole (1996) has
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a dynamic model, partly adverse selection and partly moral hazard, in which employ-
ers can observe an agent’s actions only imperfectly and cannot distinguish him from
earlier generations of agents. If past generations have been corrupt trust in the agent
will be low; this in turn gives the agent the incentive to behave corruptly. In this
way, a reputation for corruption can persist through generations. We are concerned
here with a somewhat different question: how the reputations of identifiably different
groups may interact, and how regulation may create collective reputation.
2 The Model
There are two groups, A and B, each consisting of a continuum of risk-neutral pro-
ducers of unit measure. Each group is homogeneous internally but, as we will explain
below, different from the other group in its cost structure. All producers produce the
same good, regardless of their group. They are not, however, in direct competition
with each other: we model each individual producer as a local monopolist who is able
to practice perfect price discrimination. Each producer, in each period, has a con-
tinuum of customers, each of whom has inelastic unit demand. It will be convenient
to normalize so that the measure of customers (for each firm) is 4. In each period,
a typical producer first chooses its quality of production. Quality can be either high
or low; low quality costs zero and high quality costs cqi ≥ 0 where i ∈ {A,B} is the
index of the firm’s group. The cost of achieving high quality is a fixed investment
cost, independent of the scale of production, and it must be paid in each period in
which quality is high. For each group i ∈ {A,B}, cqi is drawn at the beginning of
time 1 from an atomless distribution F on [0, a]; cqi is then fixed forever. The only
difference between the two groups is the value of cqi . Our assumption for most of
the paper is that cqA and c
q
B are independent, but we also look, in subsection 3.2, at
a model in which cqA and c
q
B are correlated. After selecting quality for the period,
the firm produces and sells quantity y ≤ 4 of the good (storage is not possible, so
there can be no value in producing quantity higher than 4). The cost function c(y),
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common to all firms in both groups, is given by c(y) = c if y ≤ λ′ and c(y) = 0 if
y > λ′, where c > 0 and λ′ > 2. As we will see, it will turn out to be crucial whether
λ′ is above or below 4. If λ′ ≥ 4 then we effectively have constant marginal cost of
production; in the other case, where λ′ < 4, marginal cost is decreasing in the relevant
range - in particular, cost of production is lower for the second half of total potential
production than it is for the first half. It is convenient to define λ = min[λ′, 4]. Then
λ = λ′ unless we have the constant marginal cost case, in which event λ = 4.
Time is discrete and infinite and labeled t = 1, 2, ... In each period a generation of
new identical risk-neutral consumers is born (we model this generation as a continuum
of measure 2 for each producer) and lives for two periods. In each of these two periods,
a consumer is randomly assigned (with equal probabilities) to a producer; thus, she
has equal probability in each period of meeting an A-producer and a B-producer.
In each of the two periods she buys and consumes at most one unit of the good.
Since arrival of consumers at firms is random, each firm will have, in any period
t ≥ 2, a measure 2 of new-born consumers, a measure 1 of old consumers who were
assigned to an A-producer last period, and a measure 1 of old consumers who were
assigned to a B-producer last period. Because of our assumption that producers are
small the chance of a consumer repeat-purchasing from a given producer is zero. On
the other hand, there is repeat purchasing as far as a particular group is concerned
(i.e., a particular customer of an A-producer may meet another A-producer later).
The formulation is intended to represent a situation in which the good is purchased
in a lumpy and infrequent manner, so that repeat purchasing (looked at from the
perspective of a group) is present but limited; furthermore there is potential for
interaction between firms in one group and firms in the other, because consumers
may buy from both groups at different times.
All consumers are identical and in each period they derive utility 0 from a low-
quality good and utility v > 0 from a high-quality one. We assume that v > c, which
ensures that there is potentially a positive surplus in any match between a producer
and a consumer. A consumer knows the group identity of a producer with whom she
is matched, but, at the time of buying, she cannot observe the quality of the good
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- she discovers this only when she consumes it. The quality (after the fact) of her
first-period purchase, if any, and the group affiliation of the firm or firms with which
she has been matched are the only pieces of information which the consumer has.
She cannot observe qualities produced at any firm before she was born, or, after she
is born, at firms with whom she is not matched. Nor can she observe the costs, cqA
and cqB, of achieving high quality.
For simplicity, we assume, as noted above, that each firm is a perfect-price-
discriminating local monopolist. This means that, after choosing quality, the firm
observes a given consumer k’s willingness-to-pay vpik, where pik ∈ [0, 1] is the con-
sumer’s belief that the good will be of high quality. The firm’s objective is to maximize
the expected present value of its profit stream, discounted by the factor δ ∈ [0, 1).
Since the firm will not meet its current customers again, it has no interest in charging
k less than vpik. Equally, it cannot charge more since k will get no surplus in the
future, and hence can have no incentive to pay extra in order, say, to learn about
quality in the firm’s group. Whatever its chosen quality, the firm will therefore sell, at
price vpik, to any customer k for whom vpik ≥ c, since these trades are certainly prof-
itable. Let the measure of these customers be y′. The cost of serving the remaining
customers is C(y′) = max[(λ − y′)c, 0]. The firm will therefore sell to the remaining
customers, at their respective valuations, if and only if the resulting revenue is at
least C(y′). In particular, it will sell to all the remaining customers if y′ ≥ λ, so that
marginal cost at y′ is zero, and to none of them if λ = 4, which would imply that
marginal cost of serving all customers is c.
For a given producer at a given period, each of its current customers’ beliefs
about its quality is independent of the producer’s past and current decisions, because
it has not served any of these customers before. Therefore its profit is independent
of its chosen quality, so it is clear that it will always choose low quality as long as
cqi > 0. Obviously this outcome is inefficient, and inferior for the producers. A natural
response would be for the group to appoint an auditor, or regulator, to maintain a
quality standard for the group as a whole. We assume therefore that each group has
such an auditor. Our main interest will be in whether heterogeneous groups benefit
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by having a common regulatory regime, so we examine two cases: (a) the separate
auditors case, in which each group has its own distinct auditor, and (b) the single
auditor case in which the two groups have the same auditor. An auditor is able, in
each period, to choose the quality level for the whole group. In the single auditor
case, the auditor chooses two levels of quality - one for group A and one for group B
- which may or may not be the same.5
In modeling the auditor in this way, what we have in mind is that he is able to
announce to the members of the association what the required quality is and that
he has the ability credibly, at zero cost, to enforce the announced standard, by, for
example, random audits and adequate sanctions. There is an issue as to whether the
auditor would have the incentive after the fact to carry out the announced punishment
of a producer who has been found not to meet the required standard. In this paper,
however, we side-step that issue by assuming, in effect, that the auditor has the ability
to commit to the sanction in advance (as in Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane (1994)).
This does not mean, though, that the auditor is able to commit publicly to choosing
a particular quality standard - that is, if he announces to the consumers that the
quality is high, he will nevertheless choose high quality only if it is in his (and the
producers’) interest to do so (in particular, if the cost of high quality is not too high).
The objective of the auditor is to maximize the unweighted sum of the utilities
(i.e., long-run discounted profits) of the firms which he is auditing. Since consumers
earn zero surplus this is the same objective as a utilitarian social planner would
pursue. Like the producers, but unlike the consumers, the auditor of group i knows
the cost cqi of high quality. An auditor does not observe the quality in a group which
he is not auditing. Although the auditor controls the quality of output, he does not
control pricing or production decisions. As a result an association does not act as
if it were a single firm; in particular, a producer, as noted above, will not offer low
introductory prices in order to allow customers to learn about the quality.
5In principle, the auditor might prefer to choose different qualities for different producers in a
given group. As our analysis below will show, this will not be in his interest. For the moment, we
make the assumption that the auditor chooses the same quality for all producers in the same group.
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Strategies
In the separate auditors case, a pure strategy σi for the auditor of group i specifies,
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At the point when a customer has to make her first-period decision whether to
buy, a consumer has two possible first-period histories, namely A and B, i.e., all
she knows is the group identity of the producer. When she makes her second-period
buying decision she has twelve possible second-period histories, denoted by (i, q; j)
where i, j ∈ {A,B} and q ∈ {h, l, φ}. For example, (A, h;B) refers to the history
in which she meets an A-producer in her first period, buys a unit and discovers that
its quality is high, and then meets a B-producer in her second period. (A, φ;B)
represents a history in which she meets an A-producer in the first period and a B-
producer in the second period, and there is no sale in the first period. The beliefs
of a consumer who is born in period t are denoted by pit : {A,B} → [0, 1] and
p˜it : H → [0, 1] where H is the set of second-period histories. pit(.) and p˜it(.) give
the probability, conditional on the observed history, that if she buys she will get a
high quality good. We will focus below on steady-state beliefs, that is, beliefs which
are not indexed by t, so that all generations have the same prior belief and the same
updating rule.
Equilibrium
We will examine pure-strategy, perfect Bayesian equilibria with steady-state be-
liefs. In the separate auditors case such an equilibrium is defined in the following
way. Each generation of consumers has a common belief system (pi(A), pi(B); p˜i(.))
and each auditor i ∈ {A,B} has a pure strategy σi such that
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t−1) and each c
q
i ∈ [0, a],
the continuation strategy defined by σi maximizes i’s expected continuation payoff,
given σj (j 6= i) and the belief system (pi(A), pi(B); p˜i(.)); and
(ii) the belief system (pi(A), pi(B); p˜i(.)) gives the true conditional probabilities of
high quality if the auditors employ the strategy pair (σA, σB).
Similarly, in the single auditor case, an equilibrium consists of a steady-state belief
system and a pure strategy σ such that, firstly, σ is optimal for the auditor after every
history given the beliefs and, secondly, the beliefs are correct given σ. In order to
avoid complications associated with knife-edge cases, we assume that, if indifferent,
the auditor always chooses high quality.
3 Equilibrium with Separate Auditors
3.1 Independent Costs
Take an arbitrary pure steady-state equilibrium in the separate auditors case,
with cqA and c
q
B independent, and consider the problem of the auditor of group i at an
arbitrary date t. He has to decide, knowing cqi , whether or not to set high quality for
this period. This decision has no effect on the prices paid this period by the current
customers of producers in group i since they do not know the current quality at the
time that they buy. Nor will it have any effect on any members of the generations
born at date t + 1 or later, since they do not observe anything dated before their
birth. Thirdly, since any date-t customer of group j will never observe the current
quality in group i, the decision will have no effect on prices paid in the future by these
consumers. The only effect will be on i’s repeat customers: those consumers born at
date t who are customers of group i at date t and will again be customers of group i
at date t+ 1.
First, note that old customers of group i who were assigned to the other group (j)
in their first period do not believe that there is any correlation between quality at i
this period and quality at j last period. This is because the auditor of group i at time
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i is independent of c
q
j .
6 That is, p˜i(j, h; i) = pi(i) and
p˜i(j, l; i) = pi(i). There are two possibilities to consider: either (a) p˜i(i, h; i) ≤ p˜i(i, l; i)
or (b) p˜i(i, h; i) > p˜i(i, l; i).
In case (a) the price paid at date t+ 1 by the repeat customers will be no higher
if they get high quality at date t than if they get low quality at date t. Clearly, then,
there can be no gain, and there will be a positive cost, from setting high quality at t.
In that case auditor i will set low quality regardless of cqi (except possibly if c
q
i = 0).
Since the beliefs are the same for all generations, in this equilibrium group i always
has low quality and no sale is ever made (since the customers always place value zero
on the goods produced by i). Even if there is a deviation and group i producers
produce and sell high-quality goods, the repeat customers will still expect low quality
next period, i.e. p˜i(i, h; i) = p˜i(i, l; i) = 0. It is easy to check that this is indeed an
equilibrium.
In case (b) the auditor derives a benefit from the higher price paid by repeat
customers next period if he sets high quality this period. He sets this benefit against
the cost cqi . Clearly there will be a critical value c
∗
i ≥ 0 such that he sets high quality
if cqi < c
∗




i . Since the beliefs are stationary across
generations the auditor faces the same problem each period, so the threshold value
c∗i is independent of history. The steady-state belief of new-borns must therefore be
that the probability of high quality at group i is given by
pi(i) = F (c∗i ).
If pi(i) is such that there is no possibility of a profitable sale, i.e. if
vF (c∗i ) < c
then new customers will not buy and so there will be no repeat customers. In that
case there will be no incentive to choose high quality and so c∗i = 0. This is the same
6Even if he could observe willingness-to-pay of former j-customers (we have assumed that he
cannot), the above argument would apply at date 2 if he has to choose quality before observing it.
Therefore, by stationarity of beliefs, independence applies at all times.
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as the equilibrium which we saw in case (a) above.
Suppose, on the other hand, that new customers do buy (so c∗i > 0). The same
will be true of old customers who were assigned to the other group in their first period
since, as we have seen, they have the same belief about i as new-borns. If a new-born
customer observes high quality at i then she deduces that cqi < c
∗
i and, by Bayes’ rule,
she must believe that she will again get high quality if assigned to i in her second
period; similarly, if she observes low quality then she will expect low quality next
period. That is, p˜i(i, h; i) = 1 and p˜i(i, l; i) = 0.
Next period there will be a measure 3 of sales made at a representative firm (2 to
new-borns and 1 to previous customers of the other group) regardless of this period’s
quality, and a measure 1 of additional repeat customers (paying v) if and only if
quality this period is high. Therefore the benefit of setting high quality is equal to
δv if λ ≤ 3 and δ(v− c(λ− 3)) if λ > 3. In the first case marginal cost of production
is zero, given the assured sales of 3, so the discounted marginal benefit is δv for each
extra unit sold; in the second case, marginal cost is c until sales reach λ. The auditor’s
strategy in each period must be to set high quality if and only if cqi is less than or
equal to the discounted marginal benefit. That is,
c∗i = min[δv, δ(v − c(λ− 3))].
Since λ ≤ 4 and c < v, c∗i > 0. If this is to be an equilibrium it must be that new
customers place value of at least c on the good. That is,
vF (min[δv, δ(v − c(λ− 3))]) ≥ c. (1)
There exist, therefore, two possibilities for each group: either there is zero probability
of high quality and the market has collapsed because of low expectations, or else sales
are made (at least to three-quarters of potential) and there is positive probability of
high quality. In total, there are four possible equilibria since beliefs about the two
groups may be asymmetric: e.g., group A may have low quality for sure while group B
has positive probability of high quality. In the low-quality case the auditor achieves
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nothing - the equilibrium is the same as if he did not exist. But, as long as (1)
is satisfied, the auditor can improve matters. Our interest will be in equilibria in
which both groups have strictly positive probability of high quality: we call these
positive-quality equilibria.
To summarize, we have the following result.
Proposition 1: If there are separate auditors and independent costs, then a
positive-quality equilibrium exists only if (1) is satisfied. In that case, there is a
unique such equilibrium. In this equilibrium, in every period, quality in group i is
high if and only if cqi ≤ c∗i .
Clearly a zero-quality equilibrium is highly inefficient. The positive-quality equi-
librium, however, will also be inefficient. In the first-best, high quality will be pro-
duced in steady-state as long as
4v − λc > cqi (2)
since the left side of this inequality is the total surplus (gross of cqi ) in the event of
high quality, and there is zero surplus if low quality is produced. In equilibrium, there
is high quality only if
min[δv, δ(v − c(λ− 3))] ≥ cqi (3)
The left side of (3) is lower than that of (2) for all δ ∈ (0, 1] since v > c. Therefore
quality is too low in equilibrium. Notice that this inefficiency is not caused by any
reputational externality. Since the two groups are independent, and since the cus-
tomers are able to distinguish one group from the other, a change in the actions of
group A, say, has no effect on the payoffs of group B, since it has no effect on the
beliefs of any customers about the quality of group B. If there is little discounting,
the inefficiency is caused instead by the fact that only a proportion of customers of
a given group will be repeat customers of that group: clearly, if there were a single




We assumed above that the cost of high quality in one group is independent of the
cost in the other group and that an auditor does not observe quality in the other group.
As a result there is no reputational externality. We suppose now that the two costs cqA
and cqB are correlated and we ask two questions: (i) is there a reputational externality
in this case (i.e., in equilibrium, would an increase in quality at one group increase
the revenue at the other)? and (ii) if so, is such an equilibrium necessarily worse
than the equilibrium in the independent costs case - in particular, can inefficiency in
this model be traced to the reputational externality? In this case it is plausible that
the externality would be present because observing quality at group A would tell you
something about cqA which in turn would give you some information about c
q
B and so
about likely quality at group B. See Benabou and Gertner (1993) for an application
of this idea in macro-economics, and Meyer and Vickers (1997) for an application to
relative performance evaluation.
The answer to (i) will be that there are indeed equilibria in which the externality is
present. In particular, if marginal cost is decreasing, there is an equilibrium in which
average quality is lower than in the positive-quality equilibrium in the independent
case: each association has an incentive to lower quality, damaging the interest of
the other group, and reducing the incentive of the other group to invest in high
quality. This lends some plausibility to the claims, referred to in the Introduction,
that considerations of reputation can cause inefficiency which needs to be tackled
by enforcement of industry-wide standards. On the other hand, the answer to (ii)
above is that the reputation effect is not intrinsically bad, because there is another
equilibrium (also exhibiting a reputational externality) in which both groups use the
same cut-off strategies as in the independent cost case. In that equilibrium, therefore,
average quality is the same as it would be without any externality; moreover, profits
are higher than in the independent cost case. Thus reputational externality is not
the main issue.
For simplicity, we look at the polar case in which there is complete correlation,
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i.e., cqA = c
q
B = c
q. Again, cq is assumed to be distributed according to F on [0, a].
We also assume that λ = 3, so that in the independent costs case the critical value
c∗ = δv. As before, we assume that an auditor cannot observe past quality at the
other group, so that equilibria derived from repeated-game considerations (enforcing
high quality by using punishments for low quality) are not feasible.7
Proposition 2: Suppose that there are separate auditors and common costs,
λ = 3 and
vF (δ(v − c)) ≥ c. (4)
Then there are two positive-quality equilibria. In one equilibrium both groups use cut-
off c∗ = δv and in the other they use cut-off δ(v − c). The first equilibrium Pareto-
dominates the second and also Pareto-dominates the positive-quality equilibrium in
the independent costs case. If there are constant marginal costs (λ = 4), or if (1)
holds but not (4), then only the first of the two equilibria exists.
Note that, since in this case (1) is vF (δv) ≥ c, (4) implies (1).
First, we set out the Pareto-inferior equilibrium; in this equilibrium the reputation
effect leads to low average quality. The strategy of each auditor is to set high quality
if and only if cq ≤ δ(v − c). New born consumers all buy at price vF (δ(v − c)). ((4)
guarantees that it is profitable to sell to them). A consumer who observes high (low)
quality at one group expects high (low) quality next period at both groups, hence is
willing to pay v (0). Clearly the beliefs are correct given the strategies because in
equilibrium each group always has the same quality as the other. If cq ≤ δ(v − c)
then i knows that next period his group will sell at least 3 units for c or more at a
representative firm next period regardless of whether he sets high or low quality this
period (2 to new-borns and 1 to previous j-customers). Marginal production cost
will therefore be zero, so the benefit of high quality is δv, which exceeds cq, hence
it is optimal to set high quality. If, on the other hand, cq > δ(v − c) then i knows
7One might ask why the auditor cannot deduce what the other group’s quality was by observing
the willingness-to-pay of customers who have previously bought from that group. Our assumption
is that only the producers, not the auditor, observe willingness-to-pay.
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that j’s quality is low and that current customers of j will therefore not buy from i
next period. Therefore, since i’s repeat customers, if any, will take production next
period from 2 to 3, the marginal benefit of high quality this period is only δ(v − c),
which is less than cq, so it is optimal to set low quality. Hence, the auditor’s strategy
is optimal. This establishes that this is an equilibrium.
However, since (1) is satisfied, there is also an equilibrium in which both groups use
the cut-off strategy defined by c∗ = δv, i.e. the same one as in the independent costs
case. In this equilibrium too, after observing the quality in one group, a consumer
attaches probability one to the event that the other group produces the same quality.
Thus, if cq ≤ c∗ an auditor knows that next period there will be sales of 3 to new-
borns and former j-customers plus, if and only if quality is high this period, repeat
purchases of 1. Therefore the benefit of high quality is c∗, which outweighs the cost.
If cq > c∗ then the benefit is less, so it is optimal to set low quality. As in the
previous equilibrium, a reduction in quality at one group will reduce the payoff at
the other, so the externality is present. However, average quality is the same as in
the positive-quality equilibrium of the previous section. Moreover, average profit is
higher. If costs are independent, the expected trading profit of a producer in group i
(excluding investment cost) is
4vpiI − 3c
where piI = F (δv) is the probability of high quality in the independent case. This is
because demand from new-borns and former j-customers totals 3, paying vpiI , and,
with probability piI , there will be 1 unit of repeat purchases, paying v. In the common
costs case, the corresponding profit is
4vpiI − c(2 + piI).
As above, demand from new-borns will be 2, paying vpiI , and, with probability piI ,
demand from repeat customers will be 1, paying v. In this case, however, previous
j-customers will only be served with probability piI , though their expected payment
will be the same (vpiI). Expected profit is therefore higher in the common costs case
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because of the saving on production cost when quality is low (expected investment
cost is of course the same in the two cases). The remainder of the proof of Proposition
2 is in the Appendix.
It is clear that the zero-quality equilibrium which we saw above will also still exist
in this setting: if each customer always believes that quality will be low then there
can be no incentive to set high quality. Similarly, there are asymmetric equilibria
in which one group uses the c∗ cut-off strategy and the other always produces low
quality, for all cq, (after a deviation in which a consumer buys from a firm in a group
which in equilibrium always produces low quality, but observes high quality, assume
that he continues to believe that cq is uniform on [0, a]).
4 Equilibrium with a Single Auditor
In this section we return to the model with independent costs and consider the
case in which there is a single auditor who, in each period, chooses a pair of qualities
(qA, qB). All the equilibria that we found in the separate auditors case will exist
in this game too. To see this, notice that if the consumers have a belief system
which assumes that the quality in group i is set entirely as a function of cqi and so is
independent of the quality in group j, then the auditor cannot gain by setting quality
in any other way. A change in the quality in group i will have no effect on the profits
of group-j producers; therefore the auditor must set i’s quality to maximize i’s profits,
and so he faces the same problem as a separate auditor would. If there are constant
marginal costs then these are the only equilibria, as the next Proposition shows.
Proposition 3: Suppose that there is a single auditor, independent costs of
investment, and constant marginal costs. Then the set of equilibria is the same as in
the separate auditors case.
Proof: Consider an arbitrary equilibrium and arbitrary date t. There is a
measure 1 of customers of group i who will again be customers of group i next period,
giving a profit next period ofmax[vp˜i(i, .; i)−c, 0], where p˜i(.) are beliefs corresponding
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to the equilibrium. There is also a measure 1 of i-customers who will be customers
of group j next period, giving a profit next period of max[vp˜i(i, .; j) − c, 0]. These
are the only consumers whose behavior will be affected by the quality in group i at t.
Therefore the auditor’s expected payoff if he sets high quality at group i at t differs
from his expected payoff if he sets low quality by the amount
δ[max[vp˜i(i, h; i)− c, 0] +max[vp˜i(i, h; j)− c, 0]−max[vp˜i(i, l; i)− c, 0]
−max[vp˜i(i, l; j)− c, 0]]− cqi .
He sets high quality if and only if this expression is non-negative. But, since the
expression is independent of quality in group j, the beliefs p˜i(.) must assume indepen-
dence, and the equilibrium must be one of the separate-auditors equilibria. QED.
In other words, regardless of the quality in group j, and regardless of the inference
that consumers draw from observing this quality, the marginal cost of production
will be the same (c) and hence the net benefit gained, via repeat customers, from
investing in high quality will be the same. Therefore the trade-off between high and
low quality in group i is independent of quality in group j. But that means that
consumers must believe that there is no correlation between the qualities in the two
groups. Even though there is only one auditor setting quality for all the producers
he cannot credibly announce, say, that there is a common standard for everyone.
If, on the other hand, there are decreasing marginal costs (λ < 4) then a comple-
mentarity may endogenously arise between qA and qB. For simplicity, we will consider
the case8 λ = 3. If group A’s quality is high and if, as a result, group A’s customers
are willing to trade in their second period with group B producers, then B producers
have more to gain from high quality (δv) than they would if A’s quality were low and
so demand for B’s products were lower (the benefit then would be δ(v − c)). So, if
consumers believe that the qualities are correlated, it will be profitable to make them
so, which in turn justifies the belief.
8For other values of λ, qualitatively similar equilibria will obtain, for different ranges of parameter
values.
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We will assume that the following two inequalities apply:
v ≥ 2c (5)
and
2δv ≥ a. (6)
If (5) and (6) are satisfied then there exists an equilibrium in which, for every pair
(cqA, c
q
B) there is a common standard for the two groups.
Proposition 4: Suppose that there is a single auditor, independent costs of
investment, and λ = 3, hence marginal costs are decreasing. Suppose also that (1), (5)
and (6) hold. Then there is an equilibrium in which both groups always have the same





≤ δ(2v − c). (7)
This equilibrium Pareto-dominates the c∗-cutoff equilibrium and has higher average
quality.
Proof: In the equilibrium, the auditor sets high quality in both groups if average
cost of investment is below δ(2v − c) and otherwise sets low quality in both. Let the
probability of the event of high quality be denoted by pˆi. Each new generation has
belief pi(A) = pi(B) = pˆi. The beliefs of old generations are given by
p˜i(i, h; i) = p˜i(i, h; j) = 1
and
p˜i(i, l; i) = p˜i(i, l; j) = 0
for i, j ∈ {A,B}. That is, if a consumer observes high quality she believes that next
period the quality at both groups will be high; similarly, if she observes low quality
she believes it will be low next period at both groups. Clearly the beliefs are correct,
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given the auditor’s strategy.
Each new-born generation buys, since vpˆi ≥ c. To see this, note that if cqA <
2δ(v − c) then, since, by (6), cqB ≤ 2δv, it must be that (7) is satisfied and so quality
is high. Therefore
pˆi ≥ pr(cqA ≤ 2δ(v − c))
and so
pˆi ≥ F (2δ(v − c).
By (1), vF (δv) ≥ c. Combining with (5) gives vpˆi ≥ c. This also establishes that
pˆi > F (c∗), so that quality is higher in the common-quality equilibrium.
It remains to check that the auditor’s strategy is optimal given the consumers’
beliefs. Clearly the auditor’s maximization problem is stationary and it suffices to
consider the effect of changing quality in one period on the profits in the following
period. Let the difference between next period’s discounted profit and the current
cost of quality be denoted by µ(qA, qB). The auditor has four possible choices for
(qA, qB): (h, h), (h, l), (l, h) and (l, l). µ is given as follows.
µ(h, h) = −cqA − cqB + 2δ[2v + 2vpˆi − 3c]
µ(h, l) = −cqA + 2δ[v + 2vpˆi − 3c]
µ(l, h) = −cqB + 2δ[v + 2vpˆi − 3c]
µ(l, l) = 2δ[2vpˆi − 2c].
For example, if quality is high at both groups, each firm will make 2v from second
period consumers, and 2vpˆi from first-period consumers. If quality is high only at A,
then each firm will make 2vpˆi from first-period consumers and v from consumers who
bought at A in their first period. If (7) is satisfied then (h, h) is better than (l, l),
and vice versa if (7) is not satisfied. (l, h) is optimal only if
cqA ≥ 2δv,
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which violates (6). Therefore (l, h) is never optimal. Similarly, neither is (h, l). This
shows that the auditor’s strategy is optimal given the beliefs of consumers.
To show that the common-quality equilibrium is Pareto-superior to the c∗-cutoff
equilibrium, we consider the event that the auditor deviates by playing the c∗-cutoff
strategy and we show that this deviation gives him a higher expected payoff than
the c∗-cutoff equilibrium does. Since the deviation by definition is inferior to the
equilibrium strategy, this shows that the auditor is better off in the former equilibrium,
and hence that it is Pareto-superior. If he deviates, his expected investment cost is the
same as in the c∗-cutoff equilibrium and his expected revenue from a repeat customer
is also the same (vF (c∗)). Like a repeat customer, an old customer who has switched
groups will pay v with probability F (c∗) and zero with probability 1− F (c∗), giving
the same expected revenue as in the c∗-cutoff equilibrium (when she pays vF (c∗) for
sure). The only differences are (i) that in the c∗-cutoff equilibrium, customers of
the latter type are served for sure rather than with probability F (c∗) hence expected
production cost is higher, and (ii) new-borns pay vF (c∗) rather than vpˆi > vF (c∗).
Hence the c∗-cutoff equilibrium gives lower expected payoff to the auditor. QED.
The conclusion is that, even though there is no reputational externality when the
groups are separately audited, it is possible to maintain higher quality and higher
expected payoff if the groups merge into a single association as long as two conditions
are satisfied: firstly, there is some element of fixed cost in production and, secondly,
the potential difference between the two groups is not too great (a is not too high, as
guaranteed by inequality (6)). The two conditions are required because it has to be
credible that the auditor will set a common standard. This cannot be credible if the
two groups are too different from each other or if there is no complementarity between
the two qualities, given the belief that there is a common standard. Intuitively, the
reason that the common-standard equilibrium is superior to the separate-auditors
equilibrium is that, assuming that the common standard is credible, the market reach
of the association is larger and, as a result, the degree of potential repeat purchasing
is increased. This improves incentives to set high quality.
If (6) is not satisfied (a > 2δv) then the common-quality equilibrium cannot exist.
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Suppose that the consumers believe that quality is always the same at the two groups.
If cqA > 2δv and c
q
B < 2δ(v−c) then the auditor will want to set high quality at B since
µ(h, h) > µ(h, l) and µ(l, h) > µ(l, l), and low quality at A, since µ(l, h) > µ(h, h)
and µ(l, l) > µ(h, l). Therefore there can be no equilibrium of this kind. There may,
however, still be a c∗-cutoff equilibrium. Suppose that 2δv < a < δv2/c ((5) ensures
that this interval is non-empty). Suppose also that F (.) is the uniform distribution.
In that case inequality (1) is δv2/a ≥ c, which is satisfied, so the c∗-cutoff equilibrium
exists by Proposition 1.
5 Asymmetric Cost Distributions and Group Sizes
5.1 Asymmetric Cost Distributions
In this section we examine what happens if the distribution of investment costs
differs between the two groups. The main question we ask is: who benefits most from
forming a merged association, a relatively high quality group (i.e., one with a low
expected cost of achieving high quality) or a relatively low quality group? One theory
might be that the high quality group gains most because, when the two groups are
separately audited, the low quality group exploits the reputation of the high quality
group, damaging the latter’s interest. We have seen, however, that, if costs are
independent, there is no collective reputation phenomenon, so this argument cannot
apply. A second theory would be that the high quality group gains most because,
when the two groups are jointly audited, the low quality group is burdened with
excessive cost of investment. We show that, on the contrary, if the cost distributions
are uniform, the low quality group benefits most from merger.
First, we consider general distributions of cost and show that, in the separate
auditors case, the high quality group has higher expected profit. More precisely, if
the distribution of B’s cost first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of A’s
cost, then A’s expected equilibrium profit is higher.
Suppose that cqA is distributed according to c.d.f. FA(.) on the interval [0, a] and
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B are independent. Suppose
also that FB(.) first-order stochastically dominates FA(.), that is, b ≥ a and FB(x) ≤
FA(x) for all x ∈ [0, b]. Thus, B is a relatively low quality group in the sense that its
cost of obtaining high quality tends to be higher.
We consider, for simplicity, the case λ ≤ 3 and we suppose that parameters are
such that the positive-quality equilibrium exists in the separate-auditors case. That
is, vFi(δv) ≥ c for i = A,B. We assume also that a > δv, so that, in equilibrium,
there is strictly positive probability of low quality in each group. In this equilibrium,
auditor i = A,B sets high quality if and only if cqi ≤ δv. The expected payoff in each
period of group i (in ex ante terms, i.e. before cqi is known), denoted Γ
S
i , is















Proposition 5: If there are separate auditors and independent costs of invest-
ment, and FB(.) first-order stochastically dominates FA(.), then A has a higher ex
ante expected payoff in the positive-quality equilibrium than B.
Proof: Using integration by parts,
∫ δv
0




Therefore (8) is true if and only if





By first-order stochastic dominance, the left-hand-side of this inequality is positive
and the right-hand-side is negative. QED.
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Now we consider the common-quality equilibrium when there is a single auditor.
As in section 4 we limit ourselves to the case λ = 3, and we assume that (1) and (5)
hold and that (6) holds for both distributions: that is, 2δv ≥ b. Denoting 2δ(2v − c)
by z, the quality is high in both groups if and only if cqA + c
q
B ≤ z.
In this equilibrium, both groups have the same expected revenue and the same
expected cost of production. Therefore expected payoff differs only inasmuch as
expected investment cost differs. Let ΓJi denote the per-period payoff for group i in
this equilibrium (J standing for ‘joint’). Then the difference between the two groups’
expected payoffs is given by
















since, for example, given cost realization cq, B will incur cost cq for sure if cq < z− a
and will incur it with probability FA(z − cq) otherwise.
Suppose now that FA(.) is the uniform distribution on [0, a] and FB(.) the uniform
distribution on [0, b]. Then, after some calculation, we have
ΓJA − ΓJB =
(a− b)[(a+ b− z)2 − ab]
2ab
and




Group B, the inefficient group, benefits more than group A from merger if ΓJA−ΓJB <
ΓSA − ΓSB. Since a < b, (ΓJA − ΓJB)− (ΓSA − ΓSB) has the opposite sign to
(a+ b− z)2 − ab+ δv2(8− δ),
which, since δv > b/2 and a < 2δv, is positive. This establishes
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Proposition 6: A low-quality group has most to gain from common auditing.
That is, if FA(.) and FB(.) are independently uniform on [0, a] and [0, b] respectively,
where a < b, then B gains more from merging than A does, assuming the merged
association has the common quality equilibrium.
5.2 Unequal Group Sizes
Suppose now that one of the groups has a larger number of members than the
other. Which group has a higher expected payoff after merging into a single associa-
tion, and which has a greater incentive to merge? We answer these questions in the
limit case in which one group is much larger than the other. The answers are that
the small group has a lower expected payoff than the large one in the merged associa-
tion, but, assuming a uniform distribution, the small group has a greater incentive to
merge. The intuition is straightforward. If the small group is separately audited, the
degree of repeat purchasing is very small, so, there being little reputational incentive
to set high quality, quality is low and profits are zero in equilibrium. In the merged
association, however, there is a positive-quality, common standard equilibrium as in
the case of equal-sized groups. Therefore the small group has a positive incentive to
merge. The large group’s incentive to merge, on the other hand, is small because the
effect of the small group is negligible. In the merged association, the quality is deter-
mined largely by the cost of quality in the larger group. The small group’s expected
investment cost is therefore higher than that of the large group, and so its profit is
lower. In effect, since the small group’s influence is low, it runs the risk of having to
produce a quality which is inappropriately high, given its cost.
We assume, as above, that (1), (5) and (6) hold and that λ = 3. The two groups
have the same distribution of investment cost cqi , with support [0, a]. Group A now
consists of a continuum of firms of measure α < 0.5, instead of measure 1; group B
has a continuum of firms of measure 1− α. As before, each firm has, in each period,
a continuum of new customers of measure 2; of these, 2α go in their second period to
a firm in group A and 2(1−α) go to a firm in group B. Thus, if α is close to zero (as
we will assume) most customers, whether at group A or group B in their first period,
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will go to group B in their second.
Consider first the case in which the two groups are separately audited. In a
positive-quality equilibrium, A’s demand in the absence of repeat purchasers would
be 2+2(1−α) > λ, so marginal cost would be zero. Therefore A optimally sets high
quality if cqA ≤ 2αδv. B’s demand in the absence of repeat purchasers is 2 + 2α < λ
and he sets high quality if cqB ≤ δ[2(1−α)v−(λ−2(1−α))c] = δ[2(1−α)v−(1−2α)c].
If α is close to zero, then A’s critical value 2αδv is also close to zero, so this cannot
be an equilibrium (new customers would not pay enough to cover production cost).
Therefore the only equilibrium is the zero-quality one, in which A producers earn
zero profit. In group B, the critical value is approximately δ(2v − c); by (1), new
customers will be willing to pay more than c, so the positive-quality equilibrium does
exist for this group.
Suppose now that the two groups form a single association. Defining µ(., .) as in
section 4, we have
µ(h, h) = −αcqA − (1− α)cqB + δ[2vpˆi − 2c+ 2v − c]
µ(h, l) = −αcqA + δ[2vpˆi − 2c+ 2αv − 2αc]
µ(l, h) = −(1− α)cqB + δ[2vpˆi − 2c+ 2(1− α)v − c]
µ(l, l) = δ[2vpˆi − 2c].
By (6), cqA, c
q
B < 2δv, so (h, l) and (l, h) are both inferior to (h, h), while (h, h) is
superior to (l, l) if αcqA + (1 − α)cqB ≤ δ(2v − c). Therefore there is an equilibrium
in which quality is high at both groups if and only if the average cost of investment
is less than δ(2v − c), and otherwise is low at both groups. When α is near zero,
this equilibrium is approximately the same as the positive-quality equilibrium of B
on its own, hence B is approximately indifferent to the merger. A, on the other
hand, benefits from joining B as long as it earns positive profit in this equilibrium. If
a ≤ δ(2v − c) then the probability of high quality is 1 and A in that case makes the
same expected profit as B, since they have the same revenue, production cost and
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expected investment cost. This profit is, per period, 4v− 3c−E(cqi ), which is strictly
positive by (5) and (6). If a > δ(2v − c) then B’s expected profit is approximately
4F [δ(2v − c)]v − 2c− F [δ(2v − c)]c− E[cqB | cqB ≤ δ(2v − c)],
while A’s is
4F [δ(2v − c)]v − 2c− F [δ(2v − c)]c− E[cqA]. (9)
A is therefore worse off than B in this equilibrium, because his expected investment
cost is higher. Nevertheless, at least in the uniform distribution case, A still makes
strictly positive profit and so benefits from joining the association. This follows
because in that case (9) is strictly positive if
8δv(2v − c)− 2δ(2v − c)c > a2 + 4ac,
but
8δv(2v − c)− 2δ(2v − c)c > 4δ2v2 + 8δvc ≥ a2 + 4ac.
where the first inequality follows from (5) and δ < 1 and the second from (6).
Summarizing the above, we have
Proposition 7: A small group (α close to zero) has a lower expected payoff
under common auditing than a large group, but gains more from common auditing.
6 Concluding Remarks
One common complaint about self-regulating professions is that they do not ac-
tually enforce properly their proclaimed standards. If so, that may be because an
auditor who identifies with and is drawn from the profession may not, after an abuse,
have the incentive to carry out the required punishment. This issue did not arise
in this paper because we assumed that an auditor can commit to enforce his cho-
sen quality. Suppose, however, that the auditor lacks this commitment power. This
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would raise questions about the optimal balance between self-regulation and state
regulation which we hope to address in subsequent work.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: First we show that the two equilibria described
are the only positive-quality equilibria. If, in some equilibrium, there is positive
probability of high quality at both groups then new-borns must buy at both groups
(otherwise there would be no incentive to set high quality). If cq is such that previous
customers of group j will buy from group i then i’s optimal cut-off is δv, while, if not,
it is δ(v − c). Therefore there are only two possible equilibrium cut-offs. To see that
both groups must use the same cut-off, suppose, for definiteness, that A uses δv and
B uses δ(v − c). New-borns must be willing to buy from B (for the reason above).
Thus, if A’s quality is high, A-customers must be willing to buy in their second period
from B because they have a higher expectation of B’s quality than new-borns, their
conditional expectation of cq being lower. So, if cq ≤ δv, B’s demand without repeat
customers is 3, which means that B’s benefit of setting high quality is δv, which is a
contradiction.
If (4) does not hold then clearly the δ(v − c) cut-off strategies do not form an
equilibrium. If there are constant marginal costs then the marginal profit is always
δ(v − c) so the δv cut-off equilibrium does not exist.
Finally, we need to show that the δv cut-off equilibrium Pareto-dominates the
δ(v−c) cut-off equilibrium. If, in the δv equilibrium, one auditor unilaterally deviates
and chooses cut-off δ(v − c), his expected payoff is
3vF (δv) + vF (δ(v − c))− 2c− F (δv)c− E(cq|cq ≤ δ(v − c)). (10)
His expected payoff in the δ(v − c) cut-off equilibrium is
4vF (δ(v − c))− 2c− F (δ(v − c))c− E(cq|cq ≤ δ(v − c)). (11)
Since (10) exceeds (11), the Proposition is proved. QED.
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